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State Regulatory Competition and the Threat to Corporate Governance
Abstract
The subject of this paper is the impact of the new globalized order on the integrity of corporate governance.
Corporate governance is the system of laws, markets and institutions that seeks to control and discipline
corporate activity in the service of the public interest. Over the last several years, many critics have bemoaned
the growing integration of various economic markets across national boundaries because it is seen to lessen
the capacity of states to regulate corporate behaviour. Essentially, the claim is that in a setting of reduced
barriers to factor and product mobility, corporations are rendered much more effective in their capacity to
extract regulatory concessions from host governments, and these concessions have the effect of lowering
social welfare. The argument is that in a setting of high international corporate mobility, footloose
corporations will relocate their operations to whichever jurisdiction offers the most congenial (meaning least
stringent) regulation.
In the face of certain corporate migration in response to more stringent regulation, states will have no choice
but to refrain from adopting socially optimal regulation. This is because states fear the loss of benefits
associated with corporate activity: namely, employment, investment and tax revenue. The effect is an
international "race to the bottom" in which states are rendered helpless in countering the effect of heightened
corporate mobility.
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Introduction
T HE SUBJECT OF THIS PAPER IS THE IMPACT OF THE NEW GLOBALIZED ORDER ON THEintegrity of corporate governance. Corporate governance is the system of
laws, markets and institutions that seeks to control and discipline corporate activ-
ity in the service of the public interest. Over the last several years, many critics
have bemoaned the growing integration of various economic markets across
national boundaries because it is seen to lessen the capacity of states to regulate
corporate behaviour. Essentially, the claim is that in a setting of reduced barriers
to factor and product mobility, corporations are rendered much more effective in
their capacity to extract regulatory concessions from host governments, and these
concessions have the effect of lowering social welfare. The argument is that in a
setting of high international corporate mobility, footloose corporations will relo-
cate their operations to whichever jurisdiction offers the most congenial (mean-
ing least stringent) regulation.
In the face of certain corporate migration in response to more stringent
regulation, states will have no choice but to refrain from adopting socially opti-
mal regulation. This is because states fear the loss of benefits associated with cor-
porate activity: namely, employment, investment and tax revenue. The effect is an
international "race to the bottom" in which states are rendered helpless in coun-
tering the effect of heightened corporate mobility
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Equally clear is the obvious prescription: an enhanced role for multina-
tional or supranational state regulators in constraining the scope for welfare-
reducing regulatory arbitrage. This is necessary to counter the efforts of
corporate migration, and to ensure the integrity of the corporate regulatory
regime.
Despite the frequency of these claims in favour of eviscerated state
capacity to regulate corporate behaviour, we are sceptical of the case in favour
of wholesale adoption of new supranational institutions or multilateral agree-
ments that seek to ensure corporate fidelity to the public interest. We do not
argue that there is no prospect for welfare-reducing state competition emanat-
ing from increased economic integration nor that initiatives designed to control
destructive state competition in the regulation of corporate behaviour are per-
verse. Rather, we seek to develop a more nuanced analysis of corporate mobil-
ity in an increasingly globalized world that recognizes the benefits of state
competition in certain circumstances, as well as the challenges that policy-mak-
ers face in devising principled constraints on corporate behaviour through
multinational agreements.
We embark on this task in several distinct stages. First, we set out the case
that has been developed against unfettered state competition in the production
and enforcement of corporate regulation. Then we evaluate these concerns by
considering the capacity of stakeholders to protect themselves through a variety
of contractual and non-contractual mechanisms. We also assess how footloose
corporations really are in changing jurisdictions in response to more lenient reg-
ulation. Against this backdrop, we discuss the scope for competitive states to
ensure the production of socially valuable regulation and then identify those cases
in which state competition is unlikely to produce outcomes that compromise
social welfare. Here, we will identify those cases where state competition will be
inimical to social welfare either because of interstate externalities or shortcomings
in the political institutions of the regulating state. Having recognized that state
competition in the provision of corporate regulation is not always conducive to
the maximization of social welfare, we then discuss different instruments to cor-
rect this problem. Interestingly, we find that the problems that lead to a destruc-
tive race to the bottom in interstate corporate regulation are manifest in the
context of efforts to develop multilateral agreements that restrict the scope for
destructive competition.
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The Role of State
Competition in the
Production of Corporate
Regulation: Normative
and Positive
Perspectives
Normative perspectives
D OES INTENSE INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION FOR CORPORATE PATRONAGE NEC-essarily mean a loss of social welfare? For many critics of globalization, the
answer to this question is in the affirmative. As described earlier, interjurisdic-
tional competition invariably forces states to adopt weak laws that secure corpo-
rate patronage (and resultant benefits), but which nevertheless impose targeted
losses on sundry stakeholder groups. In the absence of the threat of credible exit,
states would refrain from adopting suboptimal laws, and corporations would
have no choice but to comply The state's powers would be restored and global
welfare would increase.
Nevertheless, in sharp contrast to this analysis, proponents of competitive
governments have long argued for the value of state competition (typically at the
subnationallevel because this literature was developed in the context of the the-
ory of federalism) in promoting responsive and innovative government. This
analysis recognizes that although the state has extensive and coercive powers, its
accountability to the citizenry in relation to how it exercises those powers is sub-
ject to endemic accountability problems. Politicians, for instance, worry more
about re-election and short-term "credit taking" than the long-term welfare of
society Risk-averse bureaucrats worry more about their job security and scope of
authority than the quality of policy and regulatory products for which they are
responsible. Compounding problems is the fact that it is difficult for the public
to ascertain individual responsibility for government deCision-making.
Forcing governments to compete with one another to secure citizen patron-
age ensures that governments produce and enforce laws that are responsive to citi-
zen preferences. Under the Tiebout model of competitive government (Tiebout
1956), highly mobile citizens will opt to reside in the jurisdiction offering the reg-
ulatory product that most closely satisfies their individual preferences. So long as
states differentiate their regulatory programs and these programs do not entail
externalities, the resulting equilibrium will be superior to that available in a setting
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of monopoly government where citizens lack credible exit options, thereby hob-
bling their voice. l Not only does this model promise more innovative and respon-
sive government, but more specialized government as well. Governments, like
firms in private product markets, will be forced to specialize so as to differentiate
their product offerings from competitor states. In this way, all stakeholders whose
interests are bound to the corporation are better served in a competitive market-
place for regulatory products than if there were only a single monopoly supplier of
rules (or, alternatively, a producer cartel offering the same basic regulatory bundle).
In the case of national governments "competing" to attract corporate
patronage, in the form of jobs, investment and tax revenue, the question is
whether there is any apriori reason to expect that the conditions for optimal state
competition will not obtain. In the received economic model of the corporation,
the corporation stands as a "nexus of contracting relationships." In this model,
parties only enter into explicit or implicit contractual relations with the corpora-
tions if it is in their rational economic interest to do so. Further, parties will have
reasonable ex ante opportunities to secure appropriate protections from the cor-
poration that safeguards their interests. So, for instance, employees will not agree
to make significant firm-specific investments unless the corporation provides
credible assurances that their up-front investments in the corporation, in the form
of firm-specific human capital investment, will be protected through higher com-
pensation or through long-term contractual commitments (security of tenure
bonded by generous severance payments). The same is true for other stakehold-
er groups who enjoy opportunities for value-enhancing bargaining.
So long as parties have cost-effective opportunities for informed bargaining,
the prospect of inteIjurisdictional corporate mobility should not be problematic.
Corporations will not opt for the "consumption" of a new regulatory bundle,
obtained through interstate migration, that will breach either explicit or implicit
undertakings to existing stakeholders, in the current jurisdiction, or that will
diminish their ability to attract new stakeholders (in the destination jurisdiction).
Doing so would have the certain effect of imposing costs on the corporation ema-
nating from deflated stakeholder expectations. Alienated shareholders, for
instance, can discipline corporate management by working to remove them from
office by invoking the corporations normal governance processes. Further, they
can sell their shares in the corporation, thereby lowering the value of stock-based
managerial compensation. 2 Employees can commence legal actions against the
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corporation based on breach of contract, and can impose losses on the reputations
of the firm's managers that will hobble them in their future negotiations with other
stakeholder groups. The same is true for other stakeholder groups like suppliers
and creditors. Indeed, as exemplified by the recent Enron scandal in the US, not
only are corporations and their direct principals subject to discipline in the event
of failed expectations, but so too are their professional advisers (lawyers and
accountants) whose reputations are intimately linked to the corporation's conduct.
In light of the scope that stakeholders enjoy in being able to secure effec-
tive ex ante or ex post constraints on welfare-reducing corporate relocations by
corporate managers, what is the case against reliance on the competitive frame-
work for ensuring socially optimal corporate regulation?
The first concern relates to externalities. To the extent that certain stakehold-
er groups are unable to bargain effectively with the corporation because of a variety
of information, coordination and bargaining difficulties, then the scope for the cor-
poration to 'Jurisdiction shop" in a way that inflicts targeted costs on these groups is
increased. The classic example is dispersed downstream or downwind residents who
are injured by effluent discharged by an upstream or upwind polluter. Collective
action problems and information asymmetries prevent the residents from bargaining
directly with the corporation, thereby justifying the role of the state in imposing pro-
tections that fully informed parties negotiating in a transactions cost-free world
would have adopted on their own. If the regulatory regime imposed by governments
does not adopt these environmental protections owing, for instance, to the fear that
affected corporations will be relocated to competitor jurisdictions, then concentrat-
ed losses will be visited on identifiable stakeholder groups.
Whether or not certain stakeholder groups will suffer losses from state com-
petition in the production of regulation turns on a number of different factors: first,
the quality of information that stakeholders receive respecting new or impending
regulations; second, stakeholder expertise in understanding and responding to the
risks to their interests created by the corporation; third, the scope for coordination
among similarly situated stakeholders; and fourth, the opportunities for meaning-
ful citizen voice in the political processes used to vet prospective legislative or reg-
ulatory changes. In respect of this last point, where stakeholders adversely affected
by corporate behaviour are afforded transparent opportunities to participate in pub-
lic rule-making, then there is less opportunity for corporate interest groups to
steam-roll dissent in the regulation-making process.
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In the context of international jurisdiction shopping, concern over exter-
nalities is most acute when prospective jurisdictions lack basic democratic institu-
tions that would normally permit certain adversely affected interests the
opportunity to temper the rules deemed desirable by corporate managers (pre-
sumably, but not always, related to the advancement of shareholder wealth). What
is of concern here is not that states will in some cases decide to adopt rules that
entail costs for certain corporate stakeholder groups that are more than offset by
the benefits realized by other corporate stakeholder groups. After all, this is the
essence of law-making in liberal democratic countries, where legislation is often
the by-product of complex negotiation processes in which different interests are
weighed and balanced in the pursuit of improved social welfare. Indeed, assum-
ing basic human rights have been respected and that the process of regulation-
making is procedurally robust, the argument is that states have the right to adopt
regulatory outcomes that differ from outcomes adopted in other-often more
advanced--countries, and which reflect their own unique preference functions.
Rather, the more pressing concern relates to those states that systematically deprive
certain corporate stakeholder groups (e.g., employees) of the opportunity to have
their interests accounted for in the policy development process in favour of other
stakeholder groups (e.g., shareholders). These concerns are exacerbated by the
specter of non-transparent bribes and other side-payments to public officials that
will further skew the regulatory process against less powerful stakeholder interests.
Although the task of determining whether a state's institutional framework
passes democratic muster is a difficult one, it is not insuperable. 3 What is required
is not the widespread adoption of a standard template of legislation or rule-mak-
ing that duplicates the institutions and processes extant in one particular state,
but rather regard to whether affected interests have opportunities to participate
meaningfully in the deliberative processes surrounding regulation-making. These
"bare conditions of democracy" have previously been invoked to inform the
accession of certain countries to such international agreements as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). There is no reason to expect that simi-
lar standards could not be established in this area. A similar approach is appro-
priate in relation to human rights standards. Again, the enterprise is not one of
forcing countries to adopt the precise tapestry of human rights protections found
in the one national context, but rather to ensure that the basic conditions of
humanity and dignity are respected by prospective regulators. 4
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While attention to the character of domestic political institutions and human
rights regimes is responsive to concerns over the impact of prospective laws on the
welfare of certain domestic interest groups whose welfare might be affected by com-
petitive regulation, it is deficient in addressing the impact of state competition on
interests who are outside the regulating jurisdiction. Returning to the environmen-
tal example discussed earlier, the concern would arise when the stakeholders who
are principally affected by prospective regulation, say, downstream/downwind resi-
dents, are located outside the regulating jurisdiction, and they have only limited
(and costly) opportunities to participate in a fulsome manner in the regulation-
making process. 5 No doubt, these problems are exacerbated by the relatively weak
voice they would have in any domestic regulation-making process. In the absence
of full rights to public participation, such as the ability to vote in public elections,
foreign interest groups will not have the same public salience as domestic interest
groups. One possible response to this problem is for adversely affected foreign
interests to forge coalitions with domestic interest groups. However, issue-specific
alliances are often highly fragile, and, from the perspective of the foreign citizen,
unreliable. This discussion suggests that the concern over externalities is most com-
pelling in the context of foreign citizens who are adversely affected by prospective
regulation, and casts doubt over the efficacy of state competition$ capacity to pro-
duce socially desirable outcomes in these contexts.
One final externalities-related problem is that of paternalism, namely what
kind of importance should we accord to the indirect impact on the preferences of
foreign citizens from seeing citizens in another country being harmed by the reg-
ulations of that country Take, for example, the decision of country A to adopt
laws that adversely impact workers in country A by restricting collective bargain-
ing rights. Quite apart from the impact on domestic citizens of that country, citi-
zens in country B observing these rules and knowing their impact on the welfare
of least-advantaged members of country A may suffer consequent reductions in
welfare. From a global welfare perspective, domestic regulators should take
account of these reductions in the welfare of foreign citizens, but as discussed
above, in the absence of institutionalized opportunities for participation by these
citizens, are unlikely to do so.
A further complicating factor with intervention based on paternalism is the
problem of revealed preferences, namely that citizens will be prone to exaggerat-
ing the impact on their welfare of foreign regulations because it is not costly to
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do so. This gives rise to concerns that citizens will express disaffection with for-
eign regulation in order to achieve protectionist goals. Concern over the open-
ended (and malleable) character of paternalism-based claims translates into a
need to find ways of disciplining these claims. One option is to treat paternalism
claims seriously only when they are accompanied by demonstrable evidence of
disregard for the core tenets of individual autonomy and dignity. Further, to the
extent that domestic policy-makers can demonstrate that affected interests were
afforded meaningful opportunities for participation in the regulation-making
process, the force of foreign complaints will be dulled commensurately.
Positive perspectives
Given the scope for corporations to relocate their activities to jurisdictions offering
more lenient stakeholder regulation than that which currently obtains, how inter-
ested are corporations in exploiting these opportunities? The first difficulty in
answering this question is to acknowledge that although managers ought to pursue
shareholder wealth maximization as an overarching goal, it is not clear that they
actually do so. Endemic agency costs-namely the costs to shareholders of super-
vising and disciplining corporate managers-mean that managers enjoy some
scope to favour their own interests at the expense of the shareholders. In the con-
text of corporate strategic decisions regarding the location for corporate econom-
ic activity, the presence of agency costs lowers the commitment of managers to
undertake search, negotiation and, if necessary, relocation activities that serve
shareholder interests. Managerial reluctance to do so is heightened by the person-
al costs sustained by managers if relocation means that they will have to uproot
their homes and families by moving to another, less-familiar jurisdiction.6
Predictably, the personal costs of relocation can be attenuated if senior managers
are able to move discrete portions of the corporation's activities to a foreign juris-
diction without having to themselves suffer relocation (and its attendant costs).
However, let us assume that corporate managers are wholly devoted to
shareholder interests and are, therefore, committed to continuous review of the
location of the corporation's economic activities and to strategic relocation where
necessary to realize cost-savings. 7 The question is how footloose corporations will
be in response to perceived regulatory differences between the current and the
prospective jurisdiction. In discussing this issue, it is important to recognize that
any decision to move corporate activities to another jurisdiction faces non-trivial
governance in a world without frontiers
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costs.8 The corporation may have location-specific investments - namely plant
and equipment, - the value of which may not be easily be recouped if reloca-
tion means transferring existing activities to a more congenial regulatory regime.9
Of course, the same may be true of firm- and location-specific investments in
human capital. Some employees or suppliers having highly specific investments
in their relationship with the corporation may decline to relocate, again implying
the loss of sunk investments. Alternatively, they may only agree to migrate if the
corporation continues to respect, at least insofar as their situation is concerned,
existing and perhaps more stringent levels of regulation than that offered by the
destination jurisdiction. Indeed, even the relationship, and familiarity, that man-
agers have with existing regulators and regulation is characterized by sunk invest-
ments that cannot be recovered in the event of migration.
Even if corporations could recover part of this sunk investment, they still
face significant uncertainties in contemplating relocation to another jurisdiction.
Can corporations be confident that the regulatory standards offered by prospec-
tive jurisdictions will be maintained into the future? This question is of consider-
able concern to corporations because once they relocate their activities and make
sunk investments in the destination jurisdiction, they are vulnerable to "bait and
switch" strategies by the destination state. Given the status of regulatory product
as consisting of several different elements (namely law, the institutions enforcing
the law and the level of enforcement), corporations need to worry about non-triv-
ial adverse changes in regulations that can be effected through relatively informal
means (say, for instance, more vigorous enforcement).
Another important dimension of the relocation calculus facing corpora-
tions is the tied goods character of a prospective destinations regulatory product.
Because corporations cannot consume only certain aspects of the destination
jurisdiction's regulatory system and ignore others, managers must worry about
the interplay of all of the destination jurisdiction's law and regulations on the
profitability of corporate activity. Despite the fact that a prospective jurisdictions
environmental laws, for instance, may be attractive, its labour standards may be
much higher than the corporation's current jurisdiction, thereby offsetting the
benefits of migration associated with the environmental regulatory regime.
Further complicating matters is the fact that regulatory obligations cannot be sep-
arated from input factors markets. It is one thing for a state to offer a compre-
hensive and highly attractive regulatory matrix. It is another for it to combine this
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structure with an attractive business climate that ensures corporate access to a
highly skilled and reliable set of employees and suppliers. Indeed, even beyond
the content of specific regulations and the state of a country's factor markets, cor-
porations will be interested in the more general features of a country's political,
social and economic climate.
In tandem, these factors suggest that corporations will not be nearly as
feckless as some commentators have proposed in relocating jurisdictions in
response to marginal regulatory changes. Migrating corporations face certain and
non-trivial costs and uncertain benefits from relocation. This does not, however,
imply that corporations will never be prepared to relocate in response to per-
ceived regulatory differences, only that the calculus is a complex one, and this
reduces the threat value of defection to more congenial regimes.
The complexities of the demand-side for regulation are mirrored by com-
plexities extant on the supply-side. In the highly stylized model of the hyper-
globalists, states (through their elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats)
seek to retain corporate patronage, and the jobs, investment, and tax revenue that
follow in train, through the provision of a more congenial regulatory product.
Constraints imposed by ideas, institutions, or competing domestic interests are
given short shrift, or dismissed altogether. Simply put, states will do whatever it
takes to retain corporate activity, even if this requires abandonment of core demo-
cratic values or alienation of salient interest groups.
Of course, this account is highly implausible. Democratic states are account-
able to a number of different constituencies. Although politicians and bureaucrats
may yearn for the benefits of corporate activity, they will not agree to paying any
price to achieve this goal, particularly when it compromises the realization of other
goals and values. A government, for instance, that systematically favours foreign
corporate interests at the expense of certain stakeholder groups, even if they lack a
powerful political voice, may jeopardize its overall standing with the citizens. The
magnitude and timing of that discipline depends on a number of different factors:
the salience of the interest groups affected (both positively and negatively) by pro-
posed regulation, the concentration of political power, the role of the media, and
the country's political traditions and values. This more nuanced depiction of state
behaviour means that ideas and institutions are equally important parts of a coun- I
try's production process, and will affect the commitment of state actors to provid-
ing regulations that seek to attract corporate patronage'l
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Instrument Choice
I N LIGHT OF THE SCOPE FOR STATES TO SUPPLY SUBOPTIMAL LEVELS OF REGULATORYproduct in certain circumstances (most particularly, as described above, when
states have deficient democratic institutional arrangements and/or support indus-
trial activity that generates targeted transborder externalities), we now direct
attention to the various ways in which the propensity of states to supply this reg-
ulatory product can be constrained.
Regulatory cooperation via multilateral agreements
To the extent that unfettered state competition is regarded as inimical to social
welfare, one obvious option is to effect hands-tying agreements among compet-
ing states that seek to limit the scope for competition. Strong movements toward
regulatory cooperation (if not outright harmonization) can be currently witnessed
in several international institutional contexts, perhaps most obviously in the con-
text of the international trade regime with the steady diminution and elimination
of barriers to trade that the GATTlWorld Trade Organization (WTO) has engen-
dered since its introduction in 1947.10
Despite the positive effects that harmonization of international standards
using multilateral agreements may engender in some contexts, such as the inter-
national trade context, it is not always the best way to ensure that the lack of power
felt by nation-states in the presence of large corporations is contained. There are
generally two main problems associated with the use of multilateral agreements or
conventions for solving what amount to international collective action problems
and the race-to-the-bottom. The first of these problems is that states fully retain
their sovereignty in the context of multilateral agreements and can decide whether
or not they want to adopt a convention or sign onto a multilateral agreement. If
corporations exert pressure at this stage of the process (either latently or explicit-
ly), it is understandably much the same situation as if the country on its own were
solely adopting the policies because there will almost always be states that are not
parties to the agreement, thereby enjoying an accretion in competitive advantage
and becoming more attractive to economically driven corporations seeking to min-
imize costs and maximize profits. The second problem with multilateral agree-
ments as a solution to the problem of countervailing corporate power relates to the
reality that being a signatory to a multilateral agreement is not the same as guar-
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anteeing full future compliance. If the stakes are high enough, many states will
carve out pockets of exceptions by which they can both accommodate the wishes
or needs of corporations and yet, sometimes plausibly, sometimes facetiously argue
that they are abiding by the spirit of their international commitments.
One advantage of multilateral instruments as a means of checking corpo-
rate power is that multilateral agreements may serve as a credible way for gov-
ernments to stand their ground against the pressure by corporations for a "better
deal." By being able to state that they are bound by international commitments
not to legislate, regulate or enforce their laws in a compromised manner (e.g., in
a manner prejudicial to environmental protection interests, labour standards or
fair tax policies) and to point to the executed instruments that establish those
obligations, countries may be able to alleviate much of the pressure they feel to
bend the rules in favour of corporations.
Unilateral nation-state actions
Trade and economic sanctions constitute the primary way in which nation-states
attempt to unilaterally impose their desires for more humane labour practices on
the rest of world, to promote fair tax policy competition, and to endorse reason-
able protective environmental standards. However, the effectiveness of these types
of sanctions is largely dependent upon the size and importance of the economy or
economies imposing sanctions. For instance, American-led sanctions against
South Africa for human rights abuses associated with the countrys apartheid poli-
cies are widely reported to have been of considerable importance in promoting
democracy and an abandonment of apartheid, even though the United States was
only one of a large number of nations that had imposed economic sanctions on the
country: According to Peter Fitzgerald, 'The South African sanctions remain the
preeminent example, cited by proponents of state and local sanctions, of the value
of selective purchasing law and similar measures that essentially force businesses
to decide who is the more important customer-the targeted company or the state
and local government in the United States" (2001,7-8).
In addition, trade sanctions imposed against Burma by the US federal gov-
ernment also proved to be effective, at least to a limited extent, by causing some
large American-based corporations, such as Apple Computer, Phillips
Electronics, PepsiCo and Texaco to abandon their Burmese operations (Fitzgerald
2001, 11). Anecdotal evidence is certainly interesting, but it is not especially
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compelling. A comprehensive study conducted by Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott
examined 115 instances of economic sanctions imposed over a period of approx-
imately 40 years. The authors found that in the case studies examined, a success
rate of 34 percent was achieved through the use of economic sanctions-a suc-
cess that is not extraordinarily high, but certainly significant (Trebilcock and
Howse 1999,450).
One of the main uses of trade and economic sanctions surround the use of
the threat of withdrawal of a generalized system of preferences (GSP) to develop-
ing countries by the US and the European Committee. The threat of the removal
of these benefits has reportedly worked well in persuading small rogue nations of
the benefits to be had through cooperation. For example, Trebilcock and Howse
refer to changes in labour law in Malaysia, Chile and the Dominican Republic that
were at least partly engendered by these types of threats (Howse 1999, 449).
The findings of Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott and recent anecdotal experi-
ences with American-led sanctions against Iraq and other states suggest that the
unilateral imposition of trade and economic sanctions on rogue states is probably
of moderate usefulness. On the one hand, the evidence suggests that trade and
economic sanctions can be a powerful tool in causing unjust regimes to collapse
(as with apartheid). On the other hand, evidence also seems to suggest that trade
and economic sanctions can sometimes backfire on sanctions-imposing states.
For example, Thomas Henriksen has observed that
unintended consequences often flow from sanctions; instead of political ship-
wreck, they have motivated people to improvise and develop economic self-
sufficiency One classic illustration of this process is the former Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe). When first Britain and then the United Nations placed sanctions
on the breakaway Rhodesian government, the landlocked African state found
itself almost friendless in the world community During the decade from 1965
to 1975, Rhodesia transformed its economy from a near-total dependence on
imported manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials to a high degree
of self-sufficiency Only oil production and industrial machinery eluded
Rhodesian enterprise. Moreover, Rhodesia's economy initially increased its pro-
ductivity (1999).
One thing can be said for certain regarding trade and economic sanctions:
the greater the number of economies participating in the sanctions and the
greater the importance of the participating countries' economies to the rogue
state, the greater the impacts will be felt and the greater the prima facie potential
for the success of the sanctions. However, there is always the possibility that sanc-
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tions will be felt deeply, but the response, as in Rhodesia, will be stronger nation-
alism and self-reliance.
Promotion of the adoption of voluntary codes of conduct and self-regulation
Corporations can also be encouraged to respect the rights of workers and envi-
ronmental standards through voluntary codes of conduct, although it is unclear
to what extent such self-regulation is or has been successful in the past. Among
the leaders in promoting corporate self-regulation have been the member coun-
tries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
In 1976 the OECD first announced the DECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises. Since then, the OECD has revamped the Guidelines three times, most
recently in June 2000. The most recent version of the Guidelines is intended to
"ensure that the operations of enterprises are in harmony with government poli-
cies; strengthen the basis of mutual confidence between enterprises and the soci-
eties in which they operate; improve the foreign investment climate; and enhance
the contribution of multinational enterprises (MNEs) to sustainable develop-
ment" (Canada 2001). More specifically, the Guidelines provide recommendations
in these specific corporate operational areas:
• Disclosure: covers the public dissemination by MNEs of reliable and rel-
evant information on their activities.
• Employment and industrial relations: covers, inter alia, the issues of non-
discrimination, forced labour, child labour and freedom of association
and collective bargaining.
• Environment: covers issues such things as MNEs' environmental man-
agement systems and contingency planning.
• Combatting bribery: aims to eliminate bribery of foreign public officials.
• Consumer interest: seeks to ensure that MNEs respect consumer rights,
including regarding the quality and safety of products.
• Science and technology: recognizes that MNEs can play an important role
in improving local knowledge without compromising their intellectual
property rights.
• Competition: promotes respect for competition rules and avoidance of
anti-competitive behaviour.
• Taxation: addresses MNE compliance with tax laws and regulations
(Canada 2001).
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Since the Guidelines have been reviewed several times and have benefited
from considerable input from interested parties, including member and non-mem-
ber governments, non-governmental organizations and corporations, they represent
a current and comprehensive set of operational recommendations for corporations.
This wealth of information and guidance has not been squandered by corporations.
According to the OECD, nearly all Fortune 500 companies have voluntarily adopted
firm-wide codes of conduct-many of which have likely drawn heavily from the
Guidelines. In addition, the OECD reports that over 60 percent of the top 500 firms
in the UK have adopted similar codes of conduct (OECD 2000, 8).
Despite the widespread adoption of these codes of conduct by corpora-
tions, however, there remains the question of how effective they are at deterring
corporations from engaging in ethically suspect behaviour. Unenforced codes of
conduct are unlikely to govern behaviour any more than unenforced laws do.
Whether corporations monitor their far-flung operations sufficiently to ensure
robust (or even marginal) compliance with their codes of conduct is not entirely
clear. Given the costs associated with monitoring for violations of the codes of
conduct and the gains potentially to be had in operating income from violating
codes of conduct, it would not be surprising if compliance with corporate codes
of conduct was less than perfect. Given the relatively benign outcome of the
posited "race-to-the-bottom" with respect to labour rights and environmental
protections, however, it is very likely that these voluntary codes of conduct have
imposed at least some positive measure of discipline on corporations.
Social responsibility movement and its impact on the governance of corporations
The rise of the Internet, and the enhanced communication and coordination of
private party activities that it allows, has given rise to a new type of corporate
lobby group-a grassroots, techno-savvy network of social activists working
together to point out the costs and negative effects associated with corporate irre-
sponsibility the world over. One recent example of the new social activism that
the Internet has facilitated is the Burmese example referred to earlier. Although
sanctions imposed by the US federal government had much to do with some of
the large corporations presently in Burma abandoning their operations there,
much of the motivation behind the US government's decision to impose those
sanctions in the first place was a direct result of strong public pressure to act to
denounce the actions of the Burmese authoritarian military government.
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Another way in which the social responsibility movement has impacted
upon corporations is through "ethical investing" initiatives. One of the leading
organizations dedicated to promoting socially responsible investing is a Canadian
organization called the "Social Investment Organization" (OECD 2000, 63).
According to them,
socially responsible investing (sometimes known as ethical investing) is the
application of peoples' values to their investments. It includes all the financial
decision-making processes that are a part of a prudent investment management
approach, but it also includes the selection and management of investments
based on peoples' ethical, moral, social or environmental concerns (Social
Investment 2000).
The socially responsible investment movement not only decreases the
demand for shares of firms that are engaged in the traditional "sin" businesses of
alcohol or tobacco, but also for companies that have been alleged to abuse labour
rights, harm the environment, engage in military contracts, or engage in otherwise
undesirable corporate behaviour. Correspondingly, the socially responsible invest-
ment movement increases the demand for shares of companies that positively and
proactively seek to promote ethical ends such as finding ways to limit environ-
mental damage through recycling of waste. As a consequence of the reduced
demand engendered for misbehaving companies' shares resulting from the social-
ly responsible investment movement, even corporations that pay attention only to
the share price will receive negative feedback from their unethical deeds.
The extent to which this share-price suppression will occur, however, is
highly debatable, and may only represent a very small (a fraction of a percent)
discount over what the stock would otherwise trade at. This is the case because
investors who are morally neutral will always have an incentive to buy stocks that
are underpriced according to expected future cash flows. To the extent that there
are enough of these investors in the market to keep the market efficient, the dis-
count engendered by socially responsible investors will approach nil.
Since morally neutral investors will probably bid up the share price of
companies who fall out of favour with ethical or socially responsible investors
and because social activists' main impacts are on lobbying their own governments
to either take multilateral or unilateral action against so-called "rogue states," the
primary role of social responsibility movements appears to be in the movement's
ability to influence domestic governments. To the extent, however, that social
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activists can impose considerable market costs on corporations, which is usually
restricted to high-profile consumer goods producers such as PepsiCo, social
activists can play an important role independently of their influence on the state.
Conclusion
W HILE IN A COMPLETELY COMPARTMENTALIZED INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL SystEMthe threat that corporations will continue to erode the power of nation-
states and hold societies hostage through their "outlaw" status is considerable, it is
not necessarily a fait accompli in light of our expanding and developing supranation-
allegal mechanisms for reining in rogue states and impairing the ability of corpora-
tions to exercise power adversely. There are several strong mechanisms for
constraining the power of corporations in terms of their ability to capture govern-
ments to cater to their desires for low taxes, low labour standards and low environ-
mental regulatory overhead. For instance, nation-states are increasingly engaging in
multilateral agreements to help promote a united front against corporations willing
to take advantage of collective action problems and the implicit gains from defection
they involve. This is not a solution for every problem, however, because of the diffi-
culties associated with trying to force other countries to assume obligations under
the agreements as well as the issues related to the enforcement of these agreements.
Multilateral solutions work best in conjunction with the other mechanisms
described above. Unilateral action is somewhat problematic because it gives extraor-
dinary power to large economies such as those of the US and the EU to effect change,
whereas most other nations are virtually hamstrung to achieve any sort of momen-
tum for change by imposing sanctions. Voluntary codes of conduct have limited abil-
ity to constrain the actions of corporations because it is unclear exactly how such
codes of conduct can be policed or enforced. Indeed, this may explain their perverse
appeal for some socially irresponsible large corporations-they can stem the tide of
public discontent arising from their behaviour in both developed and developing
countries by pointing to their voluntary codes of conduct, while turning a blind eye
to the actual practice of their operations in far-flung parts of the globe. Finally, the
social responsibility movement appears to be a promising source of constraint on
corporations, although the extent to which this is possible has yet to be conclusive-
ly demonstrated. More research is needed in this area.
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Thus it appears that corporations, although constrained to some extent by
the considerable costs associated with moving core activities wantonly from juris-
diction to jurisdiction, still do have some mobility and some power to bend
nation-states to their will. To the extent that their threats to leave or relocate from
developed countries are not credible, the abuse of their power can be mitigated.
To the extent that their threats are credible, which they often are in the context
of production and manufacturing, their power to influence and capture govern-
ments is real. This is especially the case because most corporation manufacturing
and production takes place in developing countries which have the most to gain
from the presence of corporations, but strangely also perhaps the most to lose. In
any event, the multilateral agreements and other international movements work-
ing together to contain the adverse effects associated with corporate power and
collective action problems represent one of the most promising and potentially
effective ways yet devised of dealing with the negative effects of globalization.
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Notes
1 The terminology is from Hirschman's
famous book, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970).
2 Shareholders can also rely on a host of
other market and legal mechanisms such as
shareholder suits (breach of duty of care
and loyalty) and hostile takeovers to deal
with corporate relocations which reduce
shareholder wealth.
3 For a very thoughtful discussion of this
issue, see Leebron (1996, p. 72). Leebron
expresses scepticism over the capacity of
external observers to determine whether a
state has sound democratic processes in
place that provide confidence in outcomes
that are generated.
4 This suggestion is taken from Trebilcock
and Howse (1999).
We should further assume that these prob-
lems are not reciprocal, that is, that neigh-
bOUling states do not generate equivalent
and offsetting externalities upon each other.
6 Managers, like all citizens, derive benefits
from their communal affiliations. This is
true for their families as well. A decision to
relocate jeopardizes sunk investment in
community affiliations and reduces man-
agerial welfare.
7 In considering how a corporation will react
to the possibility of lower effective regula-
tion that is achieved through jurisdictional
relocation, it is important to bear in mind
that corporations will often strategically
overstate the costs of complying with exist-
ing or higher standards of regulation in an
effort to secure immediate reductions in the
regulatory burden from the regulating state.
But when those efforts fail, they demon-
strate remarkable agility in accommodating
themselves quickly and at low cost to the
disputed standard. More than that, many
regulations that corporations publicly pos-
ture against at the time of initial introduc-
tion later tum out to be value-enhancing
from the perspective of the corporation.
There is now a significant body of data
demonstrating that the adoption of higher
corporate governance
levels of social and labour regulation by
states are consistent with (rather than inim-
ica to) enhanced factor productivity. An
insistence, for example, on shorter work
hours for labour or more stringent occupa-
tional health and safety standards may
improve employee performance, and be
revenue-neutral, or perhaps even revenue-
enhancing to the corporation.
S The costs are in addition to the personal
costs borne by the corporation's managers,
which were discussed above.
9 Further, if relocation motivated by reduced
regulatory burdens is seen by stakeholders
to unfairly exploit certain stakeholder
groups by, for instance, managers oppor-
tunistically breaching quasi-contractual
commitments made by the corporation,
then relocation to a less stringent regime
could impose significant reputational costs
on the corporation and its managers that
will necessarily increase the future cost of
contracting to them.
10 Regional multilateral agreements have
played a key role in harmonizing interna-
tionallegal and regulatory regimes, most
prominently in the EU and under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The motivation behind and effects of the
operation of each of these multilateral
re~me~meGATTANTO,meEUand
NAFTA-are highly controversial. The rea-
son often given for this prevalent discontent
with economically driven multilateral
regimes is that many observers fear that
entering into binding multilateral trading
agreements with other nations will erode the
legitimate democratic power of the nation-
state, and lead to a loss of sovereignty, lower
labour standards and poor environmental
protection. More specifically, the fear is that
countries will lose the ability to address the
degradation of the environment, poor labour
rights protections and other compelling
social issues in a flexible way, and that this
will be replaced with international multilat-
eral commitments that are functions of gov-
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ernmental fiat thoroughly pervaded and
influenced by corporate economic interests.
Some suggest that multilaterally negotiated
agreements made by elected government
representatives are too removed from direct
democratic influence and stakeholder lobby-
ing and thus too subject to trade-offs and
political log-rolling to be legitimate despite
the fact that the majority of the government
representatives participating in the negotia-
tions are democratically elected. Fears of
this type (admittedly among others) served
to spark recent violent public protests, inter
alia, in November 1999 in Seattle at the
eighth ministerial conference of the WTO,
in April 2001 at the Summit of the Americas
in Quebec City, and in July 2001 at the G8
Summit in Genoa, Italy and seem to suggest
widespread public perception that current
multilateral agreements do not do enough to
provide for the furtherance of labour rights
and environmental protection. See Shaffer
(2001)
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